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Abstract. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between ownership 
structure and indebtedness for a sample of 2,544 Spanish small and medium enterprises. 
A System Generalized Method of Moments methodology is applied to control for the 
heterogeneity and endogeneity problems. The finding shows a negative effect of several 
measures of ownership on debt ratio. Therefore, the presence of an individual as main 
shareholder has a positive effect on debt, while the presence of a corporation as main 
shareholder exerts a negative influence. As research implications, this paper includes the 
agency problem based on principal-principal conflicts to explain the capital structure of 
small and medium enterprises, going beyond traditional principal-agent conflicts. The 
main practical implications of the paper is that owners who seek equity financing can 
use the results of this study for understanding better why investors are reluctant to invest 
in their small and medium enterprises. Policymakers can use the results of this study to 
develop better policies and to promote better provision of information for all stakehold-
ers. About the contribution of this study, we are not aware of any paper that uses a panel 
of small and medium enterprises operating in a French-civil law country to examine the 
relationship between indebtedness and three different proxies of the ownership structure.
Keywords: ownership structure, indebtedness, small and medium enterprises, System 
Generalized Method of Moments, Agency Theory, principal-principal perspective.
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Introduction
Since Berle, Means (1932) and Coase (1937), economists have been interested in the ef-
fects of the separation between ownership and control of corporate enterprises. Different 
objectives among diverse shareholders who own different percentages of the company 
and between shareholders and managers generate issues known as agency problems. 
The corporate governance literature has focused extensively on how large and diversi-
fied companies operating in countries with developed capital markets combine the use 
of their ownership and capital structures in order to minimize these agency problems 
(Aslan, Kumar 2012; Kuo et al. 2012; Morellec et al. 2012; Claessens, Yurtoglu 2013; 
Lin et al. 2013). However, we are not aware of any paper that uses a panel of small 
and medium enterprises (SMEs) operating in a French-civil law country to examine the 
relationship between indebtedness and three different proxies of the ownership struc-
ture, namely ownership concentration, the degree of control and the type of the main 
shareholder. 
This paper tries to fill this gap in the literature studying the relationship between own-
ership and capital structures as corporate governance mechanisms used by a sample of 
Spanish SMEs to mitigate agency problems. This sample has several characteristics 
that differentiate our contribution from the existing empirical research. First of all, 
SMEs in civil law countries, compared to large companies in market based economies, 
have more concentrated ownership structures, are usually owner-managed, have worse 
access to capital markets, are less influenced by the external control mechanisms and 
their investors are weakly protected. In these circumstances it becomes very important 
to analyze the relationship between ownership and capital structures from the perspec-
tive of the agency problems arising when controlling shareholders try to expropriate 
wealth from minority shareholders. The section of this paper that addresses theory goes 
beyond traditional principal-agent conflict to incorporate this recent line of research, and 
include this agency problem based on principal-principal conflicts (Dharwadkar et al. 
2000; Young et al. 2008). In addition to ownership concentration, our dataset allows us 
to use a dynamic measure of the degree of control, measured using the Cubbin-Leech 
index, and to examine the indebtedness preferences of two main types of shareholders, 
corporations and families. We apply panel data methodology and the System General-
ized Method of Moments (GMM) technique because it is more powerful in controlling 
for unobservable heterogeneity and endogeneity, which are problems that have not been 
taken into account in most of the previous studies. 
Our results show that indebtedness decreases for SMEs with more concentrated owner-
ship structures, where controlling shareholders have more power, as well as in those 
firms having a corporation as a major shareholder. In our sample of Spanish SMEs, 
the principal-principal argument suggests that controlling shareholders use less debt in 
order to increase their financial flexibility and reduce bank supervision. We also find 
that having an individual or family group as main shareholder increases the debt ratio, 
which might indicate that the capital structure is adapted, either to reduce the agency 
problems arising between the controlling family and the minority shareholders or to 
allow family shareholders to maintain their control. 
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The economic relevance of the empirical evidence presented in this paper lies on the 
crucial economic role played by SMEs (and by implication family owned and unlisted 
firms) in most developed and developing economies. SMEs account for about 99 percent 
of the total number of firms, provide 70 percent of the employment and 65 percent of 
the sales in Europe. In Spain, the numbers are very similar but the impact on employ-
ment is even higher (82 percent)1. 
The remainder of the paper is structured in four sections. In the next section, theoreti-
cal arguments and the previous empirical evidence are reviewed. The second section 
describes the data selection process, the characteristics of the sample and the methodol-
ogy employed. The third section reports the results. The main conclusions are presented 
in the final section.
1. Theory and previous evidence
The ownership concentration and the degree of control are two measures of the power 
that shareholders can exercise over the insiders. The former refers to the equity of the 
main shareholders, while the degree of control takes into account the dispersal of the 
remaining shares. 
Concentration of ownership allows shareholders to take a series of decisions that serve 
to exert their dominance in the firm. Palacín (1997) lists the following as crucial: to 
appoint the board members, to vote in general shareholder meetings, to participate in 
informal negotiations with management, to restrict the funds, to take legal action against 
directors and to influence hostile takeovers.
The second of the proposed measures, degree of control, is defined by Cubbin and 
Leech (1983) as the power to exercise greater discretion over decisions, including, in 
particular, the election of directors. As these authors point out, the traditional literature 
assumes that the majority shareholder has control of the property if their shareholding 
exceeds a certain percentage. However, Cubbin and Leech (1983) go further and argue 
that control depends on the degree of dispersion of the remainder of the ownership. 
However, it is not clear that shareholder concentration and control grade are an efficient 
corporative governance mechanism because it is possible that higher concentration in-
creases the probability of expropriation of the minority shareholders’ wealth. 
This assumption is important in the Spanish context. Spain is classified as a French-
origin civil law country by La Porta et al. (2002) and, in addition to weak investor 
protection, it is characterised by the presence of family ownership, concentrated share 
ownership and a reduced emphasis on external control mechanisms (Sánchez-Ballesta, 
Garcia-Meca 2005). This situation is more acute for SMEs than for listed firms. It is 
argued that these firms are frequently owned by a small and closed group of sharehold-
ers (Smith 2007) and the shareholders have a role of managers as well as owners (Abor, 
Adjasi 2007).
1 Data obtained from the Observatory of European SMEs 2003.
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Thus, in this governance context the principal-principal conflict is more prominent than 
the classic principal-agent. This perspective was described by Dharwadkar et al. (2000) 
and Young et al. (2008) and it arises when the different principals do not share com-
mon interests. Shareholders can have different preferences for return, risk, control and 
motivations to invest.
Therefore, the main owners are in a better position to exert direct pressure on the board 
to secure their particular interests against those of the minority shareholders. Young 
et al. (2008) argue that principal-principal conflicts are greater when the ownership of 
the firm is concentrated in the hands of one shareholder or a small number of share-
holders.
Another issue that influences the effectiveness of ownership structure as a control mech-
anism is the nature of the major shareholder. There is an extensive literature on the 
supervisory role of both corporate and individual or family investors.
Corporate investors can exert greater control in supervision for reasons of economies 
of scale. In addition, these investors may have more experience when it comes to ex-
ercising control, and can do so at less cost. However, corporations, whose investments 
are diversified, may have fewer incentives to exercise control. Therefore, managers or 
directors might either form an alliance with the corporate investors or exert some sort 
of implicit influence over them (depending on possible business that corporate inves-
tors may have with the firm), so that insider interests could still take priority over the 
shareholders’ interests. In this way, corporate shareholders can use their power to expro-
priate the wealth of minority owners in favor of the corporate controlled shareholders. 
For example, corporate shareholders can sell inputs to the firm at an inflated price or 
can obtain funds from the subsidiary firm on terms that are better than those the capital 
market offers, because the controlling shareholder can use the subsidiary firm to provid-
ing credit guarantees (Li, Qian 2013).
An individual or family group, as a major investor, would intuitively have more incen-
tive to exercise control over a corporation, as individuals or families would be less 
able to diversify their investments. These investors, however, will probably lack the 
advantages of corporate investors, such as economies of scale and experience. Setia-At-
maja et al. (2009) suggest that families tend to increase moral hazard conflicts between 
controlling and minority shareholders. For example, there may be a conflict between 
different branches of the family, and they may initiate “a ‘race to the bottom’ where 
one brother [successor] tries to tunnel resources out of the firm before another brother 
does.” (Bertrand et al. 2008; Stewart, Hitt 2012). Young et al. (2008) identify several 
ways of expropriating the wealth of minority shareholders in family firms: appointing 
less-than-skilled family members in key positions, sibling rivalry, envy between family 
members and compensation not based on merit, among others.
The financial structure is another mechanism of internal control (Claessen, Yurtoglu 
2013). It is based on the use of debt as an instrument to discipline and it has the fol-
lowing advantages (Jensen 1986; Palacín 1997): (a) Increasing debt may lead to more 
efficient conduct on the part of the managers, since their tenure depends on the survival 
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of the firm (more leveraged firm has a higher probability of bankruptcy and this fosters 
more efficient behaviour), (b) if the level of investment and participation of internal 
stakeholders remains constant, increased indebtedness leads to a further concentration 
of ownership and therefore less incentive for additional consumption of resources of 
the firm in the form of perquisites (shirking, risk avoidance, excessive salary…), (c) 
increased debt reduces the free cash flows available to managers and therefore limits 
their discretionary behavior (Jensen 1986), and (d) high levels of debt facilitate liq-
uidation of the firm through the bankruptcy process. In addition, the bank acquires 
private information about the borrowing firm that enables the bank to monitor the firm 
and implement the correct investment choices (Rajan 1992; Sharpe 1990). Periodic 
enforcement of debt covenants also performs a monitoring role. However, the use of 
debt can have negative effects, among which are the increased costs of bankruptcy and 
insolvency, the increase of agency conflicts between creditors and shareholders (Aslan, 
Kumar 2012), and the use of debt by managers to obtain control of the company with 
a smaller number of shares. Moreover, allowing the bank to develop a monopoly over 
business information, and being in a position to delay the granting of loans to the firm, 
may turn out to be costly.
Finally, there have been several works that have dealt with the interplay between the 
mechanisms used to solve the agency conflicts (for example, Hillier, McColgan 2002; 
Farinha 2003). Thus, the firm will choose the combination of different mechanisms 
which is most appropriate for each situation. One aspect that has recently attracted 
more interest is the relationship between ownership structure and debt (Lin et al. 2013; 
Morellec et al. 2012). If the concentration of ownership aligns the interests of insiders 
with outside owners, the firm will not need such a high level of debt. However, when 
the property is used to expropriate the wealth of minority shareholders, the percentage 
of debt should be greater. Al-Malkawi and Nizar (2007) and Faccio et al. (2000) find 
that highly levered firms retain their internal cash flows to meet the requirements of 
debt servicing and the controlling shareholder cannot expropriate the minority owners’ 
wealth. In this context, a controlling shareholder can reduce the use of debt to avoid 
being monitored by the lenders. 
In this context, it is of interest to test the relationship between debt ratio and ownership 
structure in Spanish SMEs. A positive relationship would imply that capital structure 
can help to reduce principal-principal conflicts, reducing the free cash flows and in-
creasing the supervision of the controlling shareholders’ actions. However, a negative 
relationship would show an entrenching of controlling shareholders, who may wish to 
avoid the supervision of lenders (Lin et al. 2013; Morellec et al. 2012).
Most of the existing empirical evidence has focused on listed firms, whereas SMEs 
have received less attention. Anderson and Reeb (2003) and Lin (2009) show a negative 
relationship between family shareholders and debt ratio. Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) find 
that family firms employ higher debt levels compared to non-family firms. Kuo et al. 
(2012) show that shareholders with large blocks of shares and family shareholding do 
not affect leverage for a sample of 145 SMEs from Taiwan. Belghitar and Khan (2013) 
show that leverage reduces the cash available in UK SMEs and so diminishes the free-
dom of action of controlling shareholders.
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2. Sample, data and methodology
The sample includes SMEs that do not operate in the financial sector for the period 1998 
to 20032. The SABI3 database is employed. Once firms with no data and with erroneous 
data are excluded, as well as firms presenting extreme values, an unbalanced panel was 
constructed comprising 2,544 companies and 10,919 observations. 
For this study the dependent variable is the debt ratio calculated as total debt to total 
assets and it is a proxy for access to debt financing for each firm (Saksonova 2006).
The concentration of shareholdings is calculated in several ways. The first method is to 
use the percentage of capital owned by the major shareholder (OWN1)4. 
Another indicator uses the Herfindahl index (H) (Herfindahl 1950), calculated as the 






H P , where 
Pi is the percentage of shares held by shareholder i.
The importance of this index derives from the fact that it takes into account that con-
centration increases if the participation of any shareholder increases at the expense of 
a minor shareholder (Curry, George 1983).
The Cubbin-Leech (1983) index, ALPHA, is used as a measurement of the degree of 
control over the firm. It indicates the probability of the main shareholder controlling the 
firm, and depends on the degree of ownership and the dispersion of ownership among 
other shareholders. This index is based on the idea that a major ownership block can 
vote together strategically, while the rest of the shareholders either vote against or in 
favor of the main shareholder or vote in random coalitions. A probability is assigned to 
each of these possibilities.
Thus, for a firm with N shareholders, with percentages of possession, 1,..., NP P , where 








P , the votes controlled by a main shareholder or coalition, S, 
formed by n shareholders, would be P(n). The votes of the remaining shareholders 
i (qi), where i = n + 1,…, N, would amount to qi = Pi or q = 0 with the same prob-
ability. Therefore, the vote of shareholder i will be a random variable with mean / 2iP  
and variance 2 / 2iP .
The votes of the primary coalition, taking this into account, will be given by 
the expression 
1






q S P n q , which is a random variable with mean 









2 To define SME we have used the size criteria proposed by the European Commission (2003).
3 System of Analysis of Iberian Balance Sheets, provided by Bureau Van Dijk.
4 Including different measures to ensure robustness of analysis has become usual practice in research into 
ownership structure (see Gedajlovic, Shapiro 1998).
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The probability that the major coalition can obtain a majority is determined by the 
expression:
 
( ) ( )
2 2
1 ( ) 1




  − −    φ = > = − φ = φ       σ σ  
 
P n
P nn q S
n n
, (1)
where P(n) represents the votes of the major shareholder or coalition and 2( )σ n  the 
squared sum of the votes of the remaining shareholders.
If the expression for the Herfindahl index, H, is substituted into 2( )σ n , the equation 
( ) ( )2 2σ = −n H P n  is obtained. Finally, substituting ( )2σ n  into ( )φ n , the degree of 
control is defined as ( ) ( ) ( )2φ = −n P n H P n .
Applying the central limit theorem, this index should follow a standard normal distribu-
tion, taking values between 0.5 and 1.0. Thus, the closer the value is to 1.0, the greater 
the probability that the major shareholder or a major group of shareholders will control 
the company.
To measure the type of main shareholder, two binary variables are used, COR and IND, 
which take values of one when the main shareholder is a corporation (COR) or an in-
dividual (IND), and are zero otherwise.
We account for the heterogeneity across firms by including several firm-specific control 
variables in our model. Variables generally used as leverage determinants (Brav 2009) 
are profitability (ROA), growth opportunities (Q), intangible assets (INT), debt cost, 
size (logarithm of total assets), age of the firm (logarithm of the number of years since 
foundation) and Z Altman Index5. 
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of all variables. The mean value of the concen-
tration of the main shareholder is 62.7%. This indicates the high level of ownership 
concentration in Spanish SMEs and the high incentive that the main shareholder can 
have to supervise insiders. The degree of control (ALPHA) takes a mean value of 0.915. 
This number is higher than that provided by Mudambi and Nicosia (1998) for financial 
firms in the British market, 0.66, but very close to the 0.90 found by Köke (2000) in 
Germany, a civil law country. Thus, the higher ownership concentration observed in 
civil law countries indicates fewer coalitions are necessary to gain control.
The 51% of the firms are owned by an individual or family investor as main shareholder, 
while the 46% of the firms have a corporation as first investor.
5 The Z-Altman index is a combination of five weighted business ratios that is used to estimate the likeli-
hood of financial distress (these ratios measure the liquidity, profitability, productivity, insolvency and ef-
ficiency of the firm). Lower values of this index represent a significant risk due to their higher probability 
of insolvency.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics
Mean Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
DEBT 0.626 0.655 0.210 0.023 0.999
OWN1 0.627 0.524 0.290 0.001 1.000
H 0.569 0.500 0.317 0.000 1.000
ALPHA 0.915 0.976 0.099 0.602 1.000
COR 0.462 0.000 0.499 0.000 1.000
IND 0.514 0.500 0.500 0.000 1.000
SIZE 14.247 16.188 0.856 6.916 17.274
LAGE 2.911 2.928 0.599 0.812 4.655
INT 0.406 0.009 0.083 0.003 0.855
COS 0.028 0.024 0.034 0.000 1.186
ROA 0.084 0.068 0.082 –0.493 0.728
Q 1.217 1.073 3.936 0.000 380.387
Z 6.556 5.887 3.283 –1.210 52.443
Variables: DEBT (total debt over total assets), OWN1 (sum of the shares of the main shareholder), 
H (Herfindahl index), ALPHA (degree of control, measured by the Cubbin-Leech index), COR (binary 
variable that takes a value of 1 when the major shareholder is a corporation, and 0 otherwise), IND 
(binary variable that takes a value of 1 when the major shareholder is an individual or family, and 0 
otherwise), SIZE (firm size), LAGE (firm age), INT (intangible assets to total assets), COS (financial 
expenses to total debt), ROA (return on assets, %), Q (firm sales in year t to firm sales in year t-1), 
Z (Z-Altman index).
Following theory, equation (2) is used to capture the relationship ownership structure 




= β + β + β + ψ + η + ε∑
n
it it j jit t i it
j
DEBT INDEPVAR OTHER , (2)
where INDEPVAR includes, alternatively, the ownership of the main shareholder 
(OWN1, model 1), the Herfindalh index (H, model 2), the control grade (ALPHA, 
model 3) and two dummies: the first will take a value of 1 when the main shareholder 
is a corporation (COR, model 4) and the second indicates the presence of a individual 
investor as main shareholder (IND, model 5). OTHER refers to the control variables, 
and yt, hi and eit are time effects, unobserved individual heterogeneity and the error 
term, respectively.
In order to control for individual heterogeneity (highlighted by Himmelberg et al. 1999, 
among others), panel data methodology is employed to estimate these relationships by 
introducing an individual effect. In addition, time dummy variables are considered in 
the model to control for the macroeconomic effects on the dependent variables. The 
GMM proposed by Arellano, Bover (1995), and Blundell, Bond (1997) is applied. The 
System GMM technique is the estimation of a system of two simultaneous equations, 
one equation in levels and the other in first differences, and these simultaneous equa-
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tions are estimated with lagged level and first difference instruments. This methodology 
solves the problem of endogeneity arising when the right-hand side variables could be 
determined simultaneously with the dependent variable, and it allows to control for the 
individual effect.
3. Results
The results are presented in Tables 2 to 4. Table 2 presents the effect of ownership 
structure variables on firm debt, while Tables 3 and 4 show the influence of the level of 
control and the type of main shareholder, respectively, on debt ratio6.
Table 2. GMM Panel Data Regression relative to the influence of ownership concentration 
variables on firm debt (DEBT)
Model (1) Model (2)
Variable Standard error Coefficient Standard error Coefficient
Constant 0.138 0.625*** 0.137 0.598***
OWN1 0.051 –0.151***
H 0.046 –0.119***
SIZE 0.008 0.030*** 0.008 0.030***
LAGE 0.007 –0.047*** 0.007 –0.047***
INT 0.066 0.022 0.066 0.023
COS 0.103 –0.096 0.100 –0.096
ROA 0.030 0.186*** 0.030 0.187***
Q 0.000 –0.001*** 0.000 –0.001***





Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Variables: DEBT (total debt over total assets), OWN1 (sum of the shares of the main shareholder), 
H (Herfindahl index), SIZE (firm size), LAGE (firm age), INT (intangible assets to total assets), COS 
(financial expenses to total debt), ROA (return on assets, %), Q (firm sales in year t to firm sales in 
year t-1), Z (Z-Altman index). z1 and z2 are two Wald tests of the joint significance of the reported 
coefficients and the joint significance of the time dummy variables, respectively (asymptotically dis-
tributed as λ2 under the null of no relationship, probability is shown); m2 is a second-order serial 
correlation test using residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null 
of no serial correlation; Sargan is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed 
as λ2 under the null of no correlation between the instruments and the error term, degrees of freedom 
in parentheses.
6 In order to control for potential multicollinearity we computed the Variance Inflation Factor and verified 
that it was never above the critical value of 5.
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Table 2 indicates a negative and significant relationship between the percentage of 
shares owned by the main shareholder (OWN1) and the indebtedness (DEBT). This 
evidence may indicate that a controlling shareholder is trying to avoid lender supervi-
sion and it can entail an expropriation of minority shareholders (in accordance with 
principal-principal conflict, Denis and Mihov 2003). However, it also possible that, 
firms with a concentrated ownership structure, as SMEs often are, can have conflicts 
between owners and creditors, due to the level of information asymmetry in this type 
of firm. This circumstance can provoke a negative relationship between debt and own-
ership (Anderson, Reeb 2003). Also, a controlling shareholder may be risk averse and 
may mitigate firm risk by employing less debt in the firm’s capital structure (Anderson, 
Reeb 2003).
The same result is found when ownership structure is measured by the Herfindahl in-
dex (H). Firms with more concentrated ownership have lower levels of debt. So, this 
relationship does not depend only on the proportion of the shares owned by the main 
shareholders but also on the concentration level of all the property.
For the control variables we obtain a positive sign for the size of the firm, SIZE, and 
return on assets, ROA; negative for the age of the firm, LAGE, growth opportunities 
and Z index; and no significant results for the intangibles and financial expenses vari-
ables. Size shows the right sign, as the larger the company is, the fewer problems of 
information asymmetry and thus, a higher probability of being more suitable to receive 
credit. The sign coincides with the results of Frank and Goyal (2009) and Kayo and 
Kimura (2011). With respect to age, a positive sign is expected a priori because the 
older the company is, the more information the company provides and the more willing 
the creditors will be to provide funds. In contrast with this hypothesis, Michaelas et al. 
(1999) argue that the older the company is, the more opportunities the company has 
had to retain earnings and thus, the more probable it is that there has been a decrease 
of debt, and so, a negative sign would be expected. The evidence supports this latter 
argument. The negative sign for the Z index is contrary to what was expected but may 
be explained by the fact that, in the computation of this variable, equity itself is part of 
the index, and more equity is associated with less debt. A similar result was obtained by 
Bartholdy and Mateus (2011). We also find a positive effect of return on assets, ROA, in 
accordance with the arguments of Modigliani and Miller (1958), who stated that higher 
profitability makes the tax shield of debt more attractive for firms7. The negative sign 
for the growth opportunities variable agrees with the arguments by Fama and French 
(2002) who argue that firms with larger growth opportunities may decide to adopt low 
7 Ownership can be considered an instrument of managerial discipline. It can also affect performance and 
performance may affect leverage, as a more profitable company tends to lower its debt, according to the 
pecking order theory of capital structure. Although the multivariate regression controls for all the covaria-
tion between variables, we have controlled for this indirect relationship by running all the regressions for 
different subsamples grouped by similar profitability values and find similar results to those obtained for 
the whole sample.
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debt levels. In this way, and in the presence of asymmetric information, they will avoid 
possible problems of underinvestment8.
The two Wald Tests (z1 and z2) show the joint significance of the reported coefficients 
and of the time dummies, respectively. To check for potential misspecification of the 
models, the m2 statistic was used, which tests for lack of second-order serial correla-
tions in the first-difference residuals. In the tests made in this study, the hypothesis of 
second-order serial correlation is always rejected. Finally, Sargan’s Test confirms the 
absence of correlation between instruments and error terms in all of the models and it 
therefore confirms the suitability of the instruments used in the estimations.
Table 3 shows the relationship between the Cubbin-Leech index (ALPHA) and debt 
ratio. A shareholder can obtain the control of the firm having a low percentage of the 
shares if the other shareholders each own only small amounts of the firm. On the other 
hand, an owner with a relative high level of ownership can have difficulty gaining con-
trol of the firm if the other shareholders own a large proportion of shares.
This measure is more complex that the measures of firm ownership concentration and 
make the results of the study more robust. As with the results shown in Table 2, we 
find a negative and significant coefficient for the Cubbin-Leech index. In this way, more 
controlled firms can demonstrate more opportunistic behavior on the part of the main 
shareholder. However, as noted earlier, the negative relationship between power and 
debt can also come from the restriction of funds by the lender or from the risk aversion 
of the controlling shareholder. On this point, we show that the level of indebtedness not 
only depends of ownership concentration but also of the degree of control.
Table 4 reports the results for the effect of the type of main shareholder on firm debt. 
First, it is observed that COR and IND variables have a significant influence on debt 
ratio and therefore they are useful in explaining firm debt. The presence of a corporation 
as main shareholder has a negative effect on debt ratio in line with the results obtained 
in Tables 2 and 3. 
For the individual dummy variable (IND), we find a positive association with debt 
ratio. This type of firm usually has a higher aversion to risk (H. DeAngelo, L. DeAn-
gelo 2000) and a higher level of information asymmetry (Attig et al. 2006). This cir-
cumstance provokes a negative relationship between debt and family control in firms. 
However, the positive sign may indicate a desire to maintain the control of the family 
group. It seems that the theory of risk aversion and credit rationing associated with 
the information asymmetry do not determine the level of debt in Spanish SMEs. The 
principal-principal conflict seems to be the cause of the negative relationship found in 
Tables 2 and 3. In this case, a family firm can mitigate the problem of expropriation of 
minority shareholders wealth by using more debt in order to maintain control over the 
8 The evidence for the control variables for the other models is very similar, and so, and in order not to be 
repetitive, we will not discuss the results for these variables again. The fact that coefficients and signifi-
cances show such stability when changing the other explanatory variables for the different equations is a 
further indication that multicollinearity is not a problem.
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firm. Evidence provided by the coefficients of COR and IND show that the impact of 
the major shareholder being a corporation/an individual or family is a 6.4% decrease/a 
6.5% increase respectively in the percentage of debt over total assets. These percent-
ages are not by any means inconsiderable, even though they are less than the impact 
of a 100% increase in ROA (18.5%). The profitability variable has always been a very 
influential variable in any analysis about financial variables in the company. The only 
other variable, apart from ROA, with higher coefficients (although not significant) than 
COR and IND is financial expenses, which seems logical. The overall evidence shows 
our study variables are important and have a substantial influence on the companies’ 
financial policies. 
Table 3. GMM Panel Data Regression relative to the influence of the grade  
of control on firm debt (DEBT) 
Model (3)














Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Variables: DEBT (total debt over total assets), ALPHA (degree of control, measured by the Cubbin-
Leech index), SIZE (firm size), LAGE (firm age), INT (intangible assets to total assets), COS (financial 
expenses to total debt), ROA (return on assets, %), Q (firm sales in year t to firm sales in year t-1), 
Z (Z-Altman index). z1 and z2 are two Wald tests of the joint significance of the reported coefficients 
and the joint significance of the time dummy variables, respectively (asymptotically distributed as λ2 
under the null of no relationship, probability is shown); m2 is a second-order serial correlation test 
using residuals in first differences, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial cor-
relation; Sargan is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as λ2 under the 
null of no correlation between the instruments and the error term, degrees of freedom in parentheses.
972
G. Hernández-Cánovas et al. Ownership structure and debt as corporate governance mechanisms ...
Conclusions
This paper analyzes the interrelationship between debt and ownership structure in 
Spanish SMEs from the Agency Theory perspective. Spanish corporate structure is 
based on French civil law. It is characterized by a high concentration of shareholdings, 
a low level of legal protection for shareholder interests, and little operation of external 
control mechanisms. In this context, the traditional principal-agent conflict may not be 
the most relevant framework to explain the relationship between ownership structure 
and debt. In SMEs, ownership and control are often not separated and the main prob-
Table 4. GMM Panel Data Regression relative to the influence of type of main shareholder  
on firm debt (DEBT)
Model (4) Model (5)
Variable Standard error Coefficient Standard error Coefficient
Constant 0.136 0.541*** 0.137 0.473***
COR 0.014 –0.064***
IND 0.013 0.065***
SIZE 0.009 0.031*** 0.009 0.031***
LAGE 0.007 –0.047*** 0.007 –0.046***
INT 0.074 0.033 0.076 0.058
COS 0.090 –0.121 0.089 –0.128
ROA 0.031 0.185*** 0.030 0.188***
Q 0.000 –0.000*** 0.000 –0.000***





Notes: *** denotes significance at the 1% level.
Variables: DEBT (total debt over total assets), COR (binary variable that takes a value of 1 when the 
major shareholder is a corporation, and 0 otherwise), IND (binary variable that takes a value of 1 when 
the major shareholder is an individual or family, and 0 otherwise), SIZE (firm size), LAGE (firm age), 
INT (intangible assets to total assets), COS (financial expenses to total debt), ROA (return on assets, 
%), Q (firm sales in year t to firm sales in year t-1), Z (Z-Altman index). z1 and z2 are two Wald 
tests of the joint significance of the reported coefficients and the joint significance of the time dummy 
variables, respectively (asymptotically distributed as λ2 under the null of no relationship, probability is 
shown); m2 is a second-order serial correlation test using residuals in first differences, asymptotically 
distributed as N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation; Sargan is a test of the over-identifying 
restrictions, asymptotically distributed as λ2 under the null of no correlation between the instruments 
and the error term, degrees of freedom in parentheses.
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lem is the expropriation of the minority shareholders’ wealth by the controlling owner 
(principal-principal conflict). The controlling shareholder may try to avoid lender su-
pervision by using less debt.
This paper shows a negative relationship between these two variables. Firms with more 
concentrated ownership (measured by the percentage of shares of the major shareholder 
and by the Herfindalh index) have less debt in their capital structure. In addition, an 
increased probability that the main shareholder can control the firm (measured by the 
Cubbin-Leech index) also reduces indebtedness. So, it seems that, from the principal-
principal perspective, the controlling shareholder will try to avoid debt in order to ex-
propriate the wealth of minority owners. 
Finally, the presence of a corporation as main shareholder reduces the debt ratio, while 
firms need more debt to reduce the agency conflicts when the major owner is an indi-
vidual or family group. It is possible that, in family firms, the preference for keeping 
control from the family group implies a willingness to accept higher levels of debt. 
This circumstance can increase the external supervision of these firms and reduce the 
principal-principal agency conflict.
The evidence presented in this paper has clear implications for firms and policy mak-
ers. Owners who seek equity financing can use the results of this study to understand 
better why investors are reluctant to invest in their SMEs. Owners can use the results to 
adopt corporate governance mechanisms that reduce wealth expropriation from minority 
shareholders, such as appointing external directors on the board and extending the good 
governance codes to their SMEs.
The flow of capital from providers to users of capital is required for a healthy and dy-
namic economy. Policymakers can use the results of this study to develop better policies 
and to promote better provision of that information for all stakeholders to help them 
understand each other more fully, enhancing the financing processes of SMEs.
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